Bias Against Understanding Terrorism

Deepak Tripathi

Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism, University of Surrey, 4 October 2010

The events of September 11, 2001 and the “war on terror” have made an undeniable impact on human and international relations. Increasingly, these relationships have come to be seen and interpreted through the prism of counter-terrorism, migration and a selective focus on “religious fundamentalism” of a certain kind, namely Islamic fundamentalism. The result has been a loss of context. The way it has changed media discourse over the last decade is more obvious. However, the nature of scholarship on terrorism and political violence has also come under pressure. The themes of migration and security, democracy and the rule of law have become more salient at the expense of the historical context, which explains imperialism, great power rivalries and other causes of conflict where the Western world has played a crucial role. Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 declaration of “The End of History” has proved short-lived and his prediction that Western liberal democracy would become universal is far from being achieved. Over the last twenty years there have been two major wars and numerous minor conflicts around the globe.

With this context in mind, I will offer a personal critique of the debate about terrorism and political violence as it has evolved in recent years. Focusing on Afghanistan since the early 1970s, I will discuss the war in its various stages and the evolution of a “culture of violence”. I will explain the internal, regional and international dimensions of the Afghan conflict and offer an indicative analysis of the failure to learn from the recent past, let alone long-term history.

First of all, I want to thank the Centre for asking me to give this talk, and to thank you for coming. I am delighted to be here. As you know, I have had a career in journalism. I went into journalism at an early age; in my late teens, but by early twenties, I was well established and found myself working for the federal government in Washington. So while I have had a long eventful, very interesting working life, the sense of fulfillment was tinged with some regret. Occasionally, I have reflected – success in finding a job perhaps came too early. I missed being close to scholarship long enough. So occasions such as this one have a special meaning for me. I am glad to be here; glad to be talking about a subject that has been close to me for many years.

Journalists and academics have an interesting relationship. Journalism is instant, scholarship reflective. Journalists are sometimes called frivolous, inconvenient, mischievous; academics deep, serious, thinking people. Disparagingly, we are called “hacks.” On the other hand, I recall occasions when a colleague in my own profession would summarily dismiss me by saying: “Deepak is not punchy enough; he is an academic.” We both have our detractors. But  on a serious level there exists a common purpose: challenging the status quo; questioning conventional wisdom. Science cannot progress, the boundaries of knowledge cannot be pushed unless we question what is now.

Now to the topic of my talk: “Bias Against Understanding Terrorism.” If there were any suggestion of frivolousness or mischievousness about it, I would deny that. I have chosen this topic to challenge the conventional wisdom which has been accumulating rapidly in the last decade, mainly in the West, but also in other parts of the world. “Terrorism” was always a highly contested term, but the ease with which “terrorism” and “freedom” – these two central terms – have entered common usage is remarkable. Remarkable because whereas they were both contested terms before, they are even more poorly defined now in the wake of September 11, 2001. Many of us have bought into the idea that we are all engaged in fighting for “freedom” and against “terrorism” when both terms remain largely undefined.

What is “freedom?” The mere fact of participation in an electoral exercise and putting our vote in the ballot box, or something more? Does taking part in periodical elections, only to see state control over citizens’ lives further tightened mean freedom? Volatility of public opinion and the “tyranny of the majority” that Alexis de Tocqueville wrote about so eloquently constantly haunt minorities and their freedoms that democracy is supposed to protect. In Europe, we are witnesses to the French government’s expulsion of Romani people and planned legislation to revoke the citizenship of certain immigrants who have acquired French nationality in recent years. Some opinion polls suggest these actions are popular in France.

I want to briefly talk about freedom in a different context which does not receive sufficient attention in the West. As many as three million nomads, people of Kuchi tribes, inhabit Afghanistan and the north in Central Asia, constantly on the move. Waves of Kuchi communities are used to migrating from north to south in Afghanistan and across the frontier inside Pakistan in harsh winter to relatively milder climate, only to move north again when spring arrives. Freedom means something different to them and they would not barter their freedom for the right to vote once every few years. Their movements have been disrupted, they are more endangered by war. Ask them what is freedom.

I was in India a few months ago, where we hear Maoist terrorists are active. The Indian press is full of stories about them. To describe them as “Maoist terrorists” is plain wrong. These are tribal people who know little, if anything, about Maoism or who Mao was. I heard accounts of what is happening in the remote areas of central India. Suddenly one day, workers hired by the state, or by a private firm, arrive in a remote tribal community. An area is cleared of trees, flattened. To appease the local tribal community, a small building, a school, is erected. The tribal population of the village is told: “Look, we have built a school for you.” Often, within days, the entire little village has disappeared from that spot; moved deep inside the forest. The tribes don’t want such rapid change in their life. Ask them what freedom is to them. The point I am trying to make is this: the “war on terror” is a war fought in the name of two concepts; both undefined despite ceaseless use of the terms “freedom” and “terrorism.” But, in fact, these terms have become tools to protect the majority against minorities, and the mighty against the weak and vulnerable. The right of self-defense of the powerful has superseded the right of the underdog to resist.

There has never been a universally accepted definition of terrorism and the United Nations has consistently failed to agree on how to define this phenomenon. Less than three decades ago, Ronald Reagan proclaimed that “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” Soviet communism has since collapsed, but geopolitical factors still play a critical part in the states’ determination of policy, more so in this post-Cold War era. Two decades after Francis Fukuyama, one of the leading lights of neoconservatism, declared “The End of History” and “universalization of Western democracy” in his 1989 essay, history has delivered a sharp rebuke to those who forget or ignore it. We are witnesses to two, I would say, three major wars: Afghanistan, Iraq and the wider “war on terror”. “Terrorism” and “terrorist” have become much overused terms of abuse for non-state groups and a handful of states while friendly states, and client regimes, can employ extreme repressive measures, and overwhelming force, and justify them in the name of self-defense.

So what is “terrorism” and what are its causes? The next part of my paper deals with these questions in trying to understand the phenomenon of terrorism, casting aside the subjectivity that clouds the debate today. I will attempt to look at “terrorism” and “political violence” (both terms are subsumed here) as part of a “culture of violence.” I will focus on Afghanistan, though parallels can be seen in Iraq, Palestine and other conflicts.

The conflict in Afghanistan can be seen in four separate but overlapping, sometimes simultaneous, stages. These stages are: internal conflict; great power involvement; state disintegration; and foreign indifference and the rise of extremism. These are the four main building blocks of a culture of violence. The question I want to raise here is: How did this dialectic play out in Afghanistan?

The last two decades of the twentieth century were a period of intense struggle between competing ideologies – a struggle which was played out in the Afghan conflict. Afghanistan was caught up in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union as early as the 1950s. The clash of capitalism and communism, both essentially Western ideologies, magnified the internal divisions in what is a tribal system in that country. Such a society has two essential characteristics – an inner weakness born out of social fragmentation, and a defensive instinct to react violently against foreign interference. These very characteristics were reinforced as intervention by massive military-economic aid and secret intelligence operations grew in Afghanistan and the country fell under Soviet domination. Afghan Communists became bolder and they seized power in a bloody coup in 1978. The rise of communism radicalized Islamic groups in Afghanistan.

Imposition of a Soviet-style system on a deeply religious people was the beginning of a chain of events which shook the Communist regime in Afghanistan. Rebellions in rural areas, mutinies and desertions in the armed forces and escalating internal warfare in the ruling People’s Democratic Party created a crisis in the country. The deeper the crisis became, the more repressive measures were used by the first Communist regime in 1978-1979.

The nature of such a chain reaction, or dialectic, is self-perpetuating. A dialectical process acquires a life of its own by virtue of what is described as the power of ‘negativity’. Negativity is what comes into being in opposition to the ‘subject’. The first ‘subject’ is a thesis in the shape of an event or force which is gradually stripped of its immediate certainty after coming into existence as it embarks on a “pathway of doubt.”

Simply put, a thesis is what rises in its environment as a distinct entity, its character imposing itself before reaching a point at which that entity begins to come under challenge by the negative force which the original thesis created. In the ensuing struggle between the thesis and its negative, or antithesis, the certainty of the original entity progressively weakens as doubts over its viability are raised. This explanation of the nature of dialectic is based on an acknowledgment that things are multi-faceted and always in the process of becoming something else.

The conflict between a thesis and its negative is a process which slowly strips the former of properties that determined its certainty and lends the latter contradictory properties. What is obtained in such a process is a reconciliation between the two – a synthesis. While the original and its negative were contrary to each other, their synthesis preserves both, and stresses unity once again. It is at this point that the synthesis transforms itself into another thesis, leading to further contradictions and conflict before reaching another stage of resolution. So the dialectical progression goes on. It has no beginning, and no end.

We can now begin to understand in dialectical terms the advent of various external and internal forces that eventually conspired to create a culture of violence in Afghanistan. When a small group of Communist sympathisers in the armed forces, representing an ideology that was foreign and contrary to the basic character of Afghan society, seized power in 1978, it was an event that was bound to lead to profound consequences. Under the Communist regime, there was a short-lived experiment to restructure Afghan society on the Soviet model – an experiment carried out by coercion, including purges, imprisonment, torture and assassination of opponents. The Marxist experiment provoked violent opposition that became progressively more stubborn as measures of the Communist regime acquired greater ruthlessness. There was resistance not only in wider society, but also within the regime. It took many forms – the Parcham (or Banner) faction against the Khalq (the Masses) faction, internal dissidents within Khalq, ethnic Pashtun against non-Pashtun, communist against anti-communist and so on. As the conflict escalated, fear and chaos began to take hold and the outcome was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

The scale of violence was altogether different during the years of Soviet occupation. The overwhelming war machine of the Communist superpower was at work and, in the final major confrontation of the Cold War, the United States threw its vast resources in support of the anti-Communist Mujahideen groups to fight that war machine. Weapons of terror were used by all sides and the conflict produced millions of victims. The violence committed by the Soviet occupation army was answered by the Mujahideen opposition on the ground.

The war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is often portrayed as one in which the Afghan resistance took on a superpower and won. This is an over-simplification, because such a view ignores the dialectical nature of the conflict which triggered intervention by other external powers in opposition to the USSR. The Mujahideen victory could not have been possible without the military and financial support from America and its allies, notably Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt and China. American and Pakistani intelligence services were deeply involved in the planning and execution of the war against the Soviet occupation forces. The role of Pakistan in the recruitment and training of anti-communist guerrillas was critical.

State intervention from outside also brought foreign militants to Afghanistan. The military government of Pakistan allowed thousands of Islamic radicals to train and fight in the conflict, which made them battle-hardened and reinforced their fundamentalist ideology. After the defeat of communism, they were left without a cause and many returned to their own countries to engage in struggle against regimes they regarded as un-Islamic and corrupt.

Islam has been a powerful force in modern Afghanistan. It was the main source of resistance to change from above, whether imperial powers like Britain and Russia tried to impose that change, or internal regimes such as those of Mohammad Daud and subsequently under Communism in the 1970s and 1980s. Religion, interwoven with a tribal system, provided the core of this resistance. It was endorsed by local mullahs who found their position in society threatened. The war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan went beyond this. Islam was used as a political ideology to bind together the disparate factions and their members at the insistence of President Zia of Pakistan and with the active support of the CIA-ISI alliance.

The idea of Islam as a political ideology, not merely a religion, to be used to reshape and control society is sometimes described as ‘Islamism’. Afghanistan is a deeply religious country, but Islamism had not taken root in the wider Afghan society before the Communists seized power in 1978. In the early 1970s, religious militancy was primarily concentrated in Kabul, where a relatively small number of educated Afghan fundamentalists fought for influence with left-wing groups in student politics and the armed forces. However, the Islamists became isolated in later years. Almost all prominent activists had fled to Pakistan by 1975, when an attempt to overthrow President Daud failed.

At this stage, the Islamist movement of Afghans underwent internal turmoil as it prepared to oppose the Daud regime. The movement split into two significant groups: the Hizb-i-Islami, dominated by ethnic Pashtuns and led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, and the mainly-Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani. The Pashtun-Tajik divide was to prove permanent, but both groups had a lot in common with their Middle Eastern counterparts. They both recruited members from the intelligentsia. Many of the activists of these Islamist groups had been students in scientific and technical institutions. They were joined by more educated Afghans and foreign militants who eventually fought against the Soviet occupation forces. They were Sunni Muslims with a strong anti-Shi‘a stance, reflecting the wider trend in the Arab world against Iran. Sunni Arab regimes, threatened by the growing Shi‘a militancy following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, wanted to keep Iranian influence in check. Their answer was to support anti-Shi‘a forces, whether it meant the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, in his war with Iran or Sunni militants in Afghanistan.

It has been suggested that the ideology of the Afghan Islamists was ‘borrowed entirely’ from two foreign movements: the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt, and the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan. Just like these two movements, the Afghan Islamists opposed secular tendencies and rejected Western influence. Within Islam, they opposed Sufi influence, with its emphasis on love and universality of all religious teachings. Rabbani was among those prominent Afghans who had spent years at al-Azhar University in Cairo and had been active in the Muslim Brotherhood. Hikmatyar, on the other hand, was close to Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami, which was itself influenced by the Brotherhood and its ideologue, Sayed Qutb. The writings of Qutb were a source of inspiration to a large number of Arabs who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The main appeal of Qutb comes from his assertion that the world is ‘steeped in jahiliyyah’, the Arabic term for ignorance. He argues that this ignorance originates from the rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth. Qutb attacks communism for denying humans their dignity and capitalism for exploiting individuals and nations. He claims that the denial of human dignity and exploitation are nothing but consequences of the challenge to God’s authority. The solution advanced by Qutb is that Islam acquires a ‘concrete form’ and attain ‘world leadership’, but this is possible only by initiating a movement for its revival.

Qutb does not openly preach violence, but other ingredients of a revolutionary brand of Islam are present in his writings. He recognises that there is a significant body of educated people who are disillusioned with the existing order. These people represent a constituency for change in a number of Middle Eastern countries, where economic and social problems, corruption and a lack of involvement in political processes have created a wide gulf between governments and the people. Qutb rejects the Communist and capitalist systems alike and  asserts that Islam is the only alternative. His vision is idealistic and its attraction very strong for the alienated looking for political adventure.

The Muslim Brotherhood was hostile to successive Egyptian governments and firmly aligned itself with the Palestinian cause after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. When Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt in 1970 following the death of Nasir, he promised to implement Islamic law and released all Brotherhood members from jail in an attempt to pacify the movement. But Sadat’s decision to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 resulted in a new confrontation, which led to his assassination in September 1981. The Muslim Brotherhood went underground and, in subsequent years, developed a complex network of more than seventy branches worldwide.

The disintegration of the Afghan state system between 1992 and 1994 and the subsequent rise of the Taliban turned Afghanistan into a haven to which foreign fighters could return without fear of retribution. Many more new Islamic radicals came from the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East to study, train and fight in Afghanistan during the Taliban period. They developed personal contacts with each other, learned about the Islamist movements of other countries and planned cross-border activities.

No other veteran of the Afghan conflict has achieved worldwide notoriety like Osama bin Laden. He had his initiation to radical Islam as a student at King Abdul Aziz University in the Saudi city of Jiddah, from where he got a degree in economics and management. It was there that bin Laden developed a deep interest in the study of Islam and used to hear recorded sermons of the fiery Palestinian academic, Abdullah Azzam. In the 1970s, Jiddah was a centre of disaffected Muslim students from all over the world and Azzam was a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. His influence encouraged bin Laden to join the movement.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, bin Laden moved with several hundred construction workers and heavy equipment to the Afghan-Pakistan border and set out to “liberate the land from the infidel invader.” He saw a desperately poor country taken over by tens of thousands of Soviet troops and millions of Muslims bearing the brunt of the military machine of a superpower. Afghans neither had the infrastructure or manpower to mount effective resistance to the occupation of their country.

Osama bin Laden created an organisation to recruit people to fight the Soviets and began to advertise all over the Arab world to attract young Muslims to Afghanistan. In just over a year, thousands of volunteers, including experts in sabotage and guerrilla warfare, had arrived in his camps. Their presence clearly suited CIA operations in Afghanistan. Bin Laden’s private army became part of the Mujahideen forces based in Pakistan and supported by the United States. Military experts with a close understanding of US policy estimated that a “significant quantity” of high-technology American weapons, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, reached bin Laden and were still with him in the late 1990s.

Bin Laden helped build an elaborate network of underground tunnels in the mountains in eastern Afghanistan in the mid-1980s. The complex was funded by the CIA and included a weapons depot, training facilities and a health centre for the Mujahideen. He set up his own training camp for Arab fighters and his following increased among foreign recruits. But he became increasingly disillusioned by two things: one, the continuing infighting in the Afghan resistance after the Soviets left; the other, America’s disengagement from Afghanistan that many saw as abandonment. Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia to work for his family business.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and it looked as though the security of Saudi Arabia was under threat,  he urged the royal family to raise a force from the Afghan war veterans to fight the Iraqis. Instead, the Saudi rulers invited the Americans – a decision that greatly angered bin Laden. As half a million US troops began to arrive in the region, bin Laden openly criticized the Saudi royal family and lobbied Islamic leaders to speak out against the deployment of non-Muslims to defend the country. It led to a direct confrontation between him and the Saudi royal family.

He left for Sudan, which was going through an Islamic revolution. He was warmly welcomed, not least because of his wealth, in a country devastated by years of civil war between the Muslim north and the Christian south. His relationship with Sudan’s de facto leader, Hasan al-Turabi, was close and he was treated as a state guest in the capital, Khartoum. Returning veterans of the Afghan conflict were given jobs and the authorities allowed bin Laden to set up training camps in Sudan. Meanwhile, his criticisms of the Saudi royal family continued. The Saudi authorities finally lost patience and revoked his citizenship in 1994. Osama bin Laden was not to return to his homeland again.

These events had a lasting impact on bin Laden. He had fallen out with the United States and the Saudi ruling establishment and his freedom of movement was severely restricted. In Khartoum, he began to concentrate on building a global network of Islamist groups. His business, Laden International, had a civil engineering company, a foreign exchange dealership and a firm that owned peanut farms and corn fields. Other business ventures failed, but he had enough money to support Islamic movements abroad. Funds were sent to militants in Jordan and Eritrea and a network was set up in the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan to smuggle Islamic fighters into Chechnya. He set up more military training camps, where Algerians, Palestinians, Egyptians and Saudis were given instructions in making bombs and carrying out sabotage.

The ideological nucleus of what became al Qaeda also attracted Ayman al-Zawahiri, regarded as Osama bin Laden’s deputy. Al-Zawahiri was born into a leading Egyptian family and fell under the influence of revolutionary Islam at an early age. His grandfather, Rabia‘a al-Zawahiri, was once head of al-Azhar Institute, the highest authority of the Sunni branch of Islam. His great-uncle, Abdul Rahman Azzam, was the first Secretary-General of the Arab League. When he was a boy of 15, Ayman al-Zawahiri was arrested for being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He trained as a surgeon, but his radical activities led to a rapid advancement in the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. By the late 1970s, when he was still in his twenties, he had taken over the leadership of the group.

In October 1981, al-Zawahiri was arrested with hundreds of activists following the assassination of President Sadat by members of his group at a military parade. The authorities could not convict him of direct involvement in the murder, but he was sentenced to three years in prison for possessing weapons. He left Egypt after his release – first going to Saudi Arabia and then to Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, from where large numbers of foreign fighters entered Afghanistan during Soviet occupation.

There is evidence that the association of Ayman al-Zawahiri with the Afghan resistance started just before his arrest in Egypt in 1981. He was a temporary doctor in a clinic run by the Muslim Brotherhood in a poor suburb of Cairo, where he was asked about going to Afghanistan to do some relief work. He thought it was a ‘golden opportunity’ to get to know a country which had the potential to become a base for struggle in the Arab world and where the real battle for Islam was to be fought. On his way to Afghanistan several years later, al-Zawahiri briefly worked as a surgeon in a Kuwaiti Red Crescent Hospital in the Pakistani frontier city of Peshawar. He made frequent visits inside Afghanistan to operate on wounded fighters, often with primitive tools and rudimentary medicines. Ayman secured his place in the Afghan resistance as someone who treated the sick and the wounded – just as Osama had secured his by virtue of being a wealthy Arab who spent his money and time helping people in an impoverished country which had been devastated by Soviet forces.

In subsequent years, al-Zawahiri emerged as an intellectual and the main ideological force behind Osama bin Laden. He enunciated clear distinctions between his and other Islamist groups. Al-Zawahiri saw democracy as a ‘new religion’ which must be destroyed by war. He accused the Muslim Brotherhood of sacrificing God’s ultimate authority by accepting the idea that people are the source of authority. Other Islamist groups were also condemned for accepting constitutional systems in the Arab world. In his view, such organisations exploit the enthusiasm of young Muslims, who are recruited only to be directed towards “conferences and elections (instead of armed struggle).”

The further al-Zawahiri went in his consideration of modern social systems, the more radicalised he became in reaction. He implied that the moral and ideological pollution was made worse by material corruption. He complained that the Muslim Brotherhood had amassed enormous wealth. This material prosperity, he said, was achieved because its leaders had turned to international banking and big business to escape the repressive and secular regime of Nasir in Egypt. Joining the Muslim Brotherhood created opportunities for its members to make a living. Their activities were driven by materialistic, rather than spiritual, aims. These views amounted to a complete rejection by al-Zawahiri and his organisation, the Islamic Jihad, of other Islamist groups and brought the Jihad closer to Osama bin Laden and his network.

The influence of the Palestinian-Jordanian academic, Abdullah Azzam, was central in all this. Azzam was a child when Israel was founded in 1948 and had been active in the Palestinian resistance movement from an early age. He had links with Yasir Arafat, but their association ended when he disagreed with the secular philosophy of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, eventually coming to the view that it was far removed from “the real Islam.” Azzam’s logic was that national boundaries had been drawn by infidels as part of a conspiracy to prevent the realisation of a trans-national Islamic state. And he came to the view that his goal was to bring together Muslims from all over the world.

Abdullah Azzam saw in the Afghan conflict an opportunity to realise this ambition. Recruitment of volunteers from all over the Muslim world to fight the Soviet occupation forces was to be an important step towards his goal to set up an Islamic internationale. To achieve this, these volunteers would train, acquire battle experience and establish links with other radical Islamic groups. The Mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan had already established a legendary reputation which would inspire potential followers all over the world. The resistance could eventually become a highly-motivated and trained force, ready to destroy the decadent West and export the Islamic revolution to other parts of the world.

In November 1989, Azzam and his two sons were assassinated in a bomb attack as they drove to a mosque in Peshawar to pray. The identity of their murderers remained a mystery, but rumours persisted about a link with bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. It was reported that while they both supported the idea of extending the struggle to overthrow Arab regimes, Azzam wanted the job completed first in Afghanistan by replacing the Communist regime of Najibullah with a Mujahideen government. Other players, including the Soviet and Afghan secret services, also had an interest in removing Azzam. Whoever was responsible for his assassination, its most significant consequence was that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri gained almost total control of the network of foreign fighters linked to the Afghan conflict.

The split between Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam in the late 1980s was the beginning of al Qaeda. Whereas Azzam insisted on maintaining the focus on Afghanistan, bin Laden was determined to take the war to other countries. To this end, bin Laden formed al Qaeda. His main goal was to overthrow corrupt and heretical regimes in Muslim states and replace them with the rule of Shari‘a, or Islamic law. The ideology of al Qaeda was intensely anti-Western and bin Laden saw America as the greatest enemy that had to be destroyed.

To sum up, we need to consider the dialectic I have been explaining that led to the creation of al Qaeda’s ideology to understand the organization itself. The two main ideologies to emerge after the Second World War were communism and free-market liberalism.  Competition between them during the Cold War obscured the challenge they faced from a third force, radical Islam in the Middle East. The first significant manifestation of this force was the Islamic revolution in Iran in the late 1970s. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s created an environment in which the challenge from radical Islam was directed against communism. America strengthened it by pouring money and weapons into the Afghan conflict, but failed to recognise that the demise of the Soviet empire would leave the United States itself exposed to assaults from groups like al Qaeda.  In time, this failure proved to be a historic blunder. And it created a “culture of violence” – a condition, fuelled by war, in which violence permeates all levels of society, and becomes part of human nature, thinking and way of life.

[END]

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The Relevance of Positivism in Social Science

Sussex Paper

Deepak Tripathi   

January 2003     

The philosophy of positivism founded by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) has come under severe criticism in the last 40 years. Criticism in itself of something that is 150 years old is not surprising. A set of theories developed by Comte so long ago is being examined and tested by social scientists now when we have the benefit of the knowledge gained over more than a century. Society has moved on in this period; there are new perspectives and many more minds ready to challenge the old theories. So the post-positivist social scientists are justified in one respect at least.[1]  

The sustained, repeated assaults on positivism over many years are quite another matter. In this respect, its critics seem to have exhausted themselves in order to demolish positivism. This raises new questions. What is post-positivism? Is it an exercise to dismiss again and again something that is old and has encountered difficulties when tested in the modern world? Does post-positivism provide a coherent alternative to positivism? Is there anything relevant in the advocacy of a scientific approach in social enquiry that Comte first advocated all those years ago?

As Anthony Giddens says, positivism has become a term of abuse. It is not fashionable to suggest that contemporary philosophers have anything to do with it. However, I am going to raise this possibility as I pose the questions mentioned in the above paragraph. But first it is important to recognise that social inquiry cannot serve its purpose if it is not relevant in the conditions in which it takes place. We need to look at positivism in its historical perspective – the social conditions in which it evolved. I will therefore examine its development to logical positivism, which I describe as a more rigorous form of positivism. I will look at some of the criticisms of positivism in today’s context. At the same time, there will be a concurrent investigation into whether there are positivist undercurrents in what the post-positivists propose. I will not hesitate to speculate about the social factors that have influenced post-positivism. I do not claim to have read all, even most, of the relevant literature before I present my view. Rather, it is an attempt to understand positivism and to determine whether it is time to accept those elements which are relevant in social science inquiry, and then move on, leaving behind those which are not. 

Development of positivism: a historical perspective

One of the most significant contributions of Comte, in his early work, was the law of three stages of knowledge. These stages were theological, metaphysical and positive. It is not in dispute that the formulation of this law played a significant role in pushing science to the forefront and relegated theology and metaphysics in the study of society. In this sense, the idea remains as relevant today as it was then. What drove him to this position?

Comte lived in the wake of the French Revolution, which began in 1789. He grew up when there was political and social upheaval in the country. It was also a period of great tensions between France and its neighbours – Austria and Britain included. France had declared war on Britain and was supporting the American war of independence against British rule.[2] On the other hand, Britain had been through the Industrial Revolution by the mid-nineteenth century. The bulk of the working population in the country had changed from agriculture to industry. Big advances in the farming methods were being introduced. Steam power had all but replaced the use of muscle, wind, and water. The textile industry was the prime example of industrialisation. Roads, railways, and steamships were to radically change the face of society. All this brought profound changes in Britain, leaving France behind. The consequences of the internal chaos and wars with other European countries were corrosive for the French society. Emmett Kennedy discusses the impact of these events on the philosophy of Comte:

The absence of any integrated, organic culture after the disorder that followed the Enlightenment and the Revolution indicated to Auguste Comte the deep malaise that beset French society. The organic worldview of medieval Christianity had been disturbed. … He approached the problems of society with reason alone; in that he was a philosopher. But he wrote from … the side that had learned the cost of corrosive criticism.[3]

It is easier to understand the intervention of Comte in the above context. His philosophy of positivism was a product of widespread upheaval in his own country, conflict with its neighbours and profound social changes brought by the Industrial Revolution in Britain. The introduction of machinery in the day-to-day running of society in Britain had propelled the use of science and technology to the forefront of human thinking. Theology and metaphysics had been demoted. It is hardly surprising that almost all of the definitions of positivism by Comte have something to do with science. For example:

Positivism is a theory of knowledge according to which the only kind of sound knowledge available to humankind is that of science grounded in observation. 

Positivism is a unity of science thesis according to which all sciences can be integrated into a single natural system.[4]   

The impact of scientific advances on society gives further clues about his work. Peter Halfpenny points out that, to Comte, sociology was the ‘queen of the sciences’. Positivism was ‘scientific’ because knowledge had practical value and the growth of science was for the benefit of humankind. To him, it was ‘empiricist’ as only humans could experience it. It was ‘encyclopaedic’ because all the sciences came under a single system of natural laws. And it was ‘progressivist’ because social stability could be restored by re-establishing a moral order, based on scientific knowledge, not on religion which made the world mysterious and prevented empirical inquiry, or metaphysical speculations which had no practical value.

As France was going through political disorder and human suffering, the main concerns for Comte would have been how to re-establish social order and achieve scientific progress for the benefit of society. Therefore, we see the assertion by him that sociology was the “queen of sciences” and that ‘all sciences came under a single system of natural law’. It is true that Comte placed great stress on hierarchy. It became even more obvious in the latter part of his life, when he began to talk of the need for ‘a strong moral order’, which his critics described as a new kind of theology. In Comte’s view, there were four enemies of the positive philosophy: religion (as a dogma not as a moral force), metaphysics (in which he included psychology), individualism (which to him was the cause of social disorder) and revolutionary utopianism.[5]

It was at this stage that those who had agreed with his early views came to oppose him. His critics were essentially positivists, but began to articulate their differences with Comte. They also showed a marked reluctance to accept the ‘positivist’ label on themselves. By this time, the assessment of Comte had begun in several centres. The English sociologist and philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was a supporter of the theory of evolution like Comte but differed with him in two important respects. For unlike Comte, Spencer was a strong advocate of the pre-eminence of the individual over society and of science over religion (Comte’s new theology of a new moral order).

In his ‘Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte’, Herbert Spencer devotes the entire first chapter to his criticism of Comte:

M. Comte’s ideal of society is one in which government is developed to the greatest extent – in which class-functions are far more under conscious public regulation than now – in which hierarchical organisation with unquestioned authority shall guide everything – in which the individual life shall be subordinated in the greatest degree to the social life.  

Spencer’s response:

That form of society towards which we are progressing, I hold to be one in which government will be reduced to the smallest amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible – one in which human nature will have become so moulded by social discipline into fitness for the social state, that it will need little external restraint, but will be self-restrained – one in which the citizen will tolerate no interference with his freedom …[6]

On Comte’s law of three stages, Spencer writes (in the same chapter) that there is one, and in essence, the same method of philosophising. The integration of causal agencies is a process, which involves the passing through all ‘intermediate steps’ between these extremes. Any appearance of stages, says Spencer, can be but ‘superficial’.

Although Spencer chose to concentrate on his disagreements with Comte, especially over his assertion about the need for subordination of the individual to universal laws, Spencer was a positivist. He may have taken issue with the law of three stages, but what he offered in its place was very similar: ‘intermediate steps’ between the extremes – theology and science. He and his contemporary English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873) applied scientific rigour to the study of society.

Like Spencer, J S Mill was also impressed with Comte’s early work, and was in fact responsible for introducing his ideas in Britain. Mill agreed with Comte that the study of society had been retarded by its failure to employ scientific methods; and he was in agreement with the empirical methods recommended by Comte, including observation, experiment, comparison and historical methods. However, being a strong supporter of individual liberty, Mill dissented from other aspects of Comte’s ideas. If Comte was the pioneer who founded positivism, Spencer, and Mill, representing the British school, followed. 

The same trend was noticeable in France, too. As Halfpenny records in Positivism and Sociology (p 23), Emile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) was instrumental in establishing an academic discipline in French universities at the beginning of the twentieth century. Durkheim adopted Comte’s major themes – empiricism, sociologism, naturalism, scientism, and social reformism, as well as contributed much to the development of sociology as a separate science. But, like Mill, he thought that Comte’s formulation of the law of three stages ‘verged on metaphysical speculation’. Durkheim added a ‘quite independent tradition’ of statistics in his book Suicide (1897); for he brought Comtean social philosophy and the collection and analysis of social facts together:

At every moment of its history, each society has a certain tendency towards suicide. The relative intensity of this tendency is measured by taking the relationship between the total of voluntary deaths and the population of all ages and sexes. We shall call this numerical datum the rate of mortality due to suicide, characteristic of the society under consideration. It is generally calculated in proportion to a million or a hundred thousand inhabitants …[7]

The areas of agreement between Comte and Durkheim were significant. Durkheim said that social facts were ‘no different’ than facts about the physical world and therefore there was no reason why the methods used to study the natural sciences could not be used in the social studies[8]. He stressed the need for objectivity and rules. And he argued that there were external objects (social factors) that influenced human behaviour, that society was greater than the sum total of its members and that the properties of society could not be understood by studying individuals only living in it.

By the 1920s and early 1930s, a group of philosophers and scientists describing itself as the Vienna Circle had begun to discuss the implications of logic for the debate. There was a striking similarity with the social conditions in which Comte founded positivism. For members of the Vienna Circle were debating in the wake of the devastation caused by the Second World War. Under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, the Vienna Circle argued for a ‘reduction of human knowledge to scientific and logical foundations’. To separate itself from positivism, the Vienna Circle adopted the term ‘logical positivism’. One of its most significant characteristics was its rejection of the non-empirical statements made in metaphysics, theology, and ethics as meaningless. Ethics and morality, the Circle believed, are a matter of taste and not connected to science. Science, the Circle said, tells only what will happen, not what should happen.

In an essay entitled ‘Logical Positivism’ (Positivism and Sociology, p 47), Peter Halfpenny makes a further distinction between positivism of Comte and that of the Vienna Circle. Logical positivism, he says, was scientistic but not progressive or social reformist. And, he adds that the Vienna Circle believed the growth of science would benefit humankind but would not do so necessarily.

Positivism and its essence 

It is very difficult to gain a clear understanding of positivism because of the number of ways in which the term has been defined and interpreted by many of its supporters and critics. It is, however, safe to say that an important goal of positivism was objectivity.  The law of three stages of Comte suggests that he used the term ‘positive’ to mean ‘scientific’. His assertion was that scientific inquiry must be empirical; it should be based on the observation of facts and not on religion which created mystery about the world, or metaphysics which was of no practical value.  In 1944, W T Stace wrote a critique of positivism. In it, he put forward his Positivist Principle, which explains the essence of positivism:

A set of words purporting to express a factual proposition P is significant only if it is possible to deduce or infer from it, in combination if necessary with other premises, some proposition or propositions (Q1, Q2, Q3 … etc), the truth or falsity of which it would be logically possible to verify by direct observation. If no such direct deductions are possible, then the set of words purporting to express P is non-significant, and P is not really a proposition at all.[9] 

The use of verification by ‘direct observation’ is noticeable. For it helped to free positivism of theological and metaphysical presuppositions. Stace developed from this the Principle of Observable Kinds later in the essay, and explained why (p 218). He recalled that the Vienna School had, at one stage, required full and complete verification under the ‘Principle of Verifiability’, but had faced difficulty. It was realised that if direct verification were required, statements about the past would become ‘non-significant’, because it was logically impossible to observe the past. For the same reason, if complete verification were required, all universal statements would be impossible to verify. As a consequence, the Vienna school later came to accept indirect and partial verification. Stace said that, in his Principle of Observable Kinds, verification meant the possibility of observing at least some of the effects of a statement for it to be significant. 

We require general laws for verification. Laws, in turn, characterise relationships between given objects. We need data to arrive at general laws. In his System of Positive Philosophy (1830, pp 5-6), these were precisely the recommendations of Auguste Comte.[10] Writing his essay, In Defence of Positivism (Sociological Theory, 1985, pp 24-36), Jonathan Turner makes strong criticisms of modern sociologists who, he says, have portrayed Comte as an ‘eccentric’ and positivism as ‘negative’ and ‘naïve’. He says that modern sociologists ‘rarely theorise’, which is why our knowledge about the social universe is ‘embarrassingly little’. Turner’s view is that this lack of knowledge is because ‘we have failed to be positivists in Comte’s sense of the term’.

Post-Positivism: some reflections      

Post-positivism is a confusing term. It does not represent one school of thought, but includes philosophers and social scientists that have been strongly critical of Comte and ‘logical positivism’ of the Vienna Circle over the last four decades. For example, there are those who reject the positivist view that the aim of scientific investigation should be to find regularities between events, or laws that can be used to make society better; rather, they say, human behaviour cannot be determined by external laws and the investigation should be into the underlying causes of events (Critical Realism). Then there are advocates of social inquiry by interpretation (Interpretive account). Some say there should be a strict separation between objectivity and all value judgements (Ideal types). Still others regard theories as catalytic agents that will overthrow, or replace the established order and create something new (Critical Theory). There are advocates of social inquiry into the actions of individual actors (Methodological Individualism) and of inquiry within a framework (Functionalism). And so on …

Positivism was about understanding the world so that we could predict and control it by changing laws. In a period of chaos in Europe, it was for order and unity. Post-positivism has renounced unity and represents ‘methodological pluralism’.[11]

Yosef Lapid has described post-positivism as a ‘loosely patched-up umbrella’ of remotely related articulations.[12] I am interested in looking at the context in which the new philosophy of science is seeking to establish itself. This context is radically different from the glory days of ‘logical positivism’ in the 1920s and 1930s. The Second World War (1939 – 1945) ended in the defeat of fascism and set the stage for the economic and political reconstruction of Western Europe. Since the 1950s, we have seen an intensification of the ideological war, followed by the defeat of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The United States and West European countries have enjoyed an increasing degree of individual freedom and prosperity in the second half of the twentieth century. Countries of the former Communist bloc are rapidly moving towards that goal. This is reflected in the ‘pluralism’ of the post-positivist era.

Also in the second half of the twentieth century, decolonisation has seen the emergence of a large number of new nations. First, it happened as a result of the withdrawal by the old colonial powers like Britain and France from Asia and Africa; then, in Europe and Central Asia when the Soviet Union disintegrated. The process has been chaotic. Political upheaval still continues in several parts of the world, but there is little doubt that the most important social and political phenomenon to emerge out of all this is democracy. There has been greater pluralism of ideas and political views in societies which are mature democracies: for example, the United States and West European countries. One need not go back more than 40 years to see this diversity in the movements opposed to the American role in Vietnam, nuclear armament, capitalism and free trade, environmental pollution and so forth. The main characteristic of these, and of the social phenomena like the Hippie movement in the 1960s, has been opposition to the ‘established order’. Even as problems with the centrally planned economic system in the Soviet bloc were becoming increasingly obvious, and the system was collapsing, Marxist thinking continued to exercise considerable influence at university campuses and the thinking of many post-positivist philosophers (in Critical Realism and Critical Theory, for example). 

Clearly, a ‘more precise formulation’ of the vastly differing post-positivist philosophies is needed to understand them better. Debra Morris has provided an account that distinguishes post-positivism from its predecessor and suggests some common features within its components.[13] According to Morris, post-positivism represents: (1) a determination to free theoretical speculation from strict dependence on confirming data (2) gives the theory component ‘a pride of place’ and approaches science in a philosophical way, and (3) opens a direct link to democratic theory. 

The most simple and enduring definition of democracy is that of Abraham Lincoln, who described it as ‘a government of the people, by the people, and for the people’. However, democracy in the second half of the twentieth century, both in aspiration and reality, has thrown complications. Different individuals and groups in each society have differing views about its meaning and how it would best serve the interests of citizens. Nationalist aspirations have given rise to an increasing number of conflicts. Spirited debates continue in established democracies about what kind of society there should be. Such debates cannot take place without ‘democratic individuality’[14] and ‘perspectivism’[15]. The former acknowledges the right of equal say for each individual, the latter allows underlying assumptions in the formulation and application of theory. The need for maintaining neutrality or distance from the objects of social inquiry does not come into it.

What then happened to objectivity? As assumptions have become an accepted part of post-positivism, its supporters may say that objectivity is not really their goal. Those who engage in social inquiry critical of the existing order claim that they want to change the status quo in any case. Others contend that post-positivistic pluralism creates conditions for ‘objective conclusions’ to be reached. This presupposes that all those who wish to reach objective conclusions have the knowledge to do so. Another major problem arises in deciding which of the large number of alternatives to choose, and how to avoid ‘ignorance’ or ‘intolerance’ in the absence of clear ‘criteria’?[16] Indeed, as Thomas Biersteker says, ‘post-positivist scholars have been extremely effective critics but have been generally reluctant to engage in the construction and elaboration of alternative interpretations and understandings’. 

Having focused on the many differences, let us finally see what remains common between positivism and post-positivism. Rejection of metaphysical inquiry in favour of science was the most important feature of positivism. It remains among the foundations of modern social inquiry. The role of theory and science was always crucial for positivists.[17] So it is today. To Comte, positivism had practical value and the growth of science was for the benefit of humankind. Most post-positivist scholars would not deny that such reformist tendencies remain among their underlying objectives. Data collection and analysis are still part of social inquiry. The purpose of all these examples is not to deny that the two have significant differences. They do and their differences are well established. It is, however, time to move on from the debate that focuses on the criticisms of positivism towards a more coherent post-positivistic philosophy in social science.*

*Word Count: 3960.

Bibliography

- Biersteker, Thomas. September 1989. “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations”, International Studies Quarterly: Volume 33, Issue 3, pp 265-266.

- Durkheim, Emile. 1897. Suicide (ed) Thompson, K & Martell, Luke (1985). ResFac, Sussex Library.

- Why do Durkheim’s theories remain appealing to social scientists?. EssayBank, available from http://www.essaybank.co.uk/free_coursework/335.html (accessed on 20 November 2002).

- Giddens, Anthony. 1977. Positivism and its critics (pp 29-95) of Studies in Social and Political Theory.  London: Hutchinson.

- History of Anglo-French relations. 29 October 2002. Guardian, from politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0%2C11538%2C821636%2C00.html (accessed on 25 November 2002).

- Halfpenny, Peter. 1982. Positivism and Sociology. London: George Allen and Unwin.

- Kateb, George. August 1984. “Democratic Individuality and the Claims of Politics”, Political Theory: Volume 12, Issue 3, p 332.

- Kennedy, Emmett. 1989. A Cultural History of the French Revolution [online]. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. From www.tasc.ac.uk/histcourse/frenrev/resource/20a1.htm (accessed on 6 December 2002).   

- Lapid, Yosef. September 1989. “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist era”, International Studies Quarterly: Volume 33, Issue 3, pp 235-254.

- McLennan, Gregor. 2000. The New Positivity (Ch 1, pp 18-20) of For Sociology: Legacies and Prospects (ed) Eldridge, J, MacInnes, J et al. London: Sociology Press.  

- Morris, Debra. April 1999. “How Shall We Read What We Call Reality?: John Dewey’s New Science of Democracy”, American Journal of Political Science: Volume 43, Issue 2, pp 611-612.

- Spencer, Herbert. 1864. Reasons for Dissenting from M. Comte [online]. From www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/spencer.htm (accessed 0n 15 November 2002).

- Stace, W T. July 1944. “Positivism”, Mind, New Series: Volume 53, Issue 211, pp 215-237.

- Turner, Jonathan. Autumn 1985. “In Defence of Positivism”, Sociological Theory: Volume 3, Issue 2, pp 24-30.


[1] Anthony Giddens, ‘Positivism and its critics’ (Studies in Social and Political Theory, 1977, pp 29-95). 

[2] History of Anglo-French relations, Guardian, 29 October 2002, from   politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0%2C11538%2C821636%2C00.html). 

[3] Emmett Kennedy, A  Cultural History of the French Revolution (1989, pp 374-384), available online www.tasc.ac.uk/histcourse/frenrev/resource/20a1.htm.

[4] Peter Halfpenny, Positivism and Sociology (1982, p 114). 

[5] Peter Halfpenny (p 18).[6] Herbert Spencer, Reasons for Dissenting from M. Comte (1864), available from http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/spencer.htm

[7] Emile Durkheim, Suicide, Part Four, K Thompson and Luke Martell (ed), 1985, p 95.

[8] For an overview, see ‘Why do Durkheim’s theories remain appealing to social scientists’, from http://www.essaybank.co.uk/free_coursework/335.html.

[9] W T Stace, ‘Positivism’ (Mind, New Series, July 1944, p 215).

[10] Jonathan Turner, ‘In Defence of Positivism’ (Sociological Theory, Autumn 1985, p 24).

[11] Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospect of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era’ (International Studies Quarterly, September 1989, p 244).

[12] Yosef Lapid (p 239).

[13] Debra Morris, ‘How Shall We Read What We Call Reality?: John Dewey’s New Science of Democracy’ (American Journal of Political Science, April 1999, pp 611-612).

[14] George Kateb, ‘Democratic Individuality and the Claims of Politics’ (Political Theory, August 1984, p 332).

[15] Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospect of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era’ (International Studies Quarterly, Sep 1989, p 241).  In the same article, he identifies, in addition to ‘perspectivism’, two more component themes of post-positivism: ‘paradigmatism’ and ‘relativism’.

[16] Thomas Biersteker, ‘Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations’ (International Studies Quarterly, September 1989, pp 265-266).

[17] Gregor McLennan, ‘The New Positivity’ (For Sociology: Legacies and Prospects, 2000, pp 18-20). 

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